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In this paper we examined effects of bank consolidations on the financial system, using the 
data on the Japanese banking industry before the Second World War, when the first bank merger wave 
occurred.  The focuses of our analysis are the governance structure and performance of banks.  With 
respect to the governance structure, we found that consolidations had an effect of excluding the 
unfavorable director interlocking between banks and the related firms, especially, in the case of 
absorbing consolidations (the consolidation where one participant was dominant).  This finding is 
significant, because it sheds light on the process in which “related lending” or “insider lending,” 
pervasive in the countries in the early stages of economic development, disappears.  Concerning the 
performance of banks, we confirmed that consolidations had a positive impact on deposit growth, 
while they did not have an effect to enhance bank profitability.  The positive impact on deposit 
growth was significant for the stability of the financial system in prewar Japan, because due to the lack 
the deposit insurance system, the financial system was continuously exposed to the risk of bank run.  
   2
1. Introduction 
    Since the late 1990’s, a wave of bank consolidations has spread across Japan.  Besides three mega 
mergers, which resulted in Mizuho Financial Group, UFJ Bank and Sumitomo-Mitsui Bank, the 
Financial Service Agency (FSA) announced a policy to promote mergers between regional financial 
institutions in 2002.  The implications of bank consolidation to the financial system in general is not 
only an issue of great relevance, but has also been one of the focuses of the current literature on 
banking and finance (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan [1999]; Rhoades[1998]; Saunders and 
Wilson[1999], etc.).  In this paper, we approach this issue, by using the data on the Japanese banking 
industry before the Second World War.  As will be shown in the following section, the recent merger 
trend is the second wave of bank mergers in Japanese financial history.  From the 1920s to the 1940s, 
there was a large bank merger movement in Japan.  We intend to identify significant lessons relevant 
to the present situation from the analysis of the rich historical data gathered from the first wave.  
    The literature on the prewar Japanese financial system has often stressed the system’s fragility.  
First, because a system of deposit insurance did not exist and numerous small banks existed, bank runs 
took place frequently.  While Britain and Canada also lacked a deposit insurance system during the 
prewar period, the number of banks did not climb above 200 in the twentieth century (Saunders and 
Wilson[1999]).  On the other hand,  more than 2000 banks existed in Japan during the early 
twentieth century, and consequently, the sixteen series of bank runs occurred from 1896 to 1927   3
(Yabushita and Inoue[1993]).  In particular, the bank runs in 1927 propagated themselves over the 
whole of the country, and 45 banks were closed. 
     Second, many banks were controlled by certain industrial companies through capital and 
personal relationships, and those banks tended to give unsound loans to those companies (Kato[1957]; 
Takahashi and Morigaki[1968]). Okazaki and Yokoyama[2002] compiled a comprehensive data base 
on the directors that controlled the interlocking between the banks and industrial companies, and 
found that the performance of those banks with many interlocked directors tended to be poor
1.  The 
bank-firm relationship in which the firm controls the bank, is essentially different from that of the 
Main Bank System in postwar Japan, where the bank monitors the firm (Aoki and Patrick[1994]). The 
phenomenon that industrial companies control banks is not specific to prewar Japan.  La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Zammari[2001] stresses so called “related lending” in contemporary Mexico 
and many other developing countries.  They made it clear that those banks which went bankrupt after 
the Mexican financial crisis in the 1990s, had, compared with surviving banks, concentrated their 
loans to the related companies. 
     On the other hand, a large wave of bank consolidations took place in Japan after the 1920s.  We 
examine the effects of this merger wave on the above two characteristics of the financial system.  The 
focuses of the analyses are as follows.  First, we focus on the governance structure of the bank.  
                                                        
1 Okazaki and Yokoyama[2002] used various performance measures, including ROA and the 
probability of bank run.   4
Specifically, we examine the effects of the bank consolidation on the extents and quality of the director 
interlocking between banks and industrial companies.  It is known that the close bank-firm 
relationship was pervasive in New England in the nineteenth century, as well as in contemporary 
developing countries (Lamoraux[1994]), which suggests that this kind of relationship is, to some 
extent, universal in the early stages of economic development.  This paper sheds light on the process 
leading to the disappearance of this relationship during the process of economic development. 
    Second, the effects of consolidation on bank performance are examined.  Here we focus on the 
two performance indicators reflecting the stability of the financial system, namely the ability to collect 
deposits and profitability.  In prewar Japan, where the deposit insurance system did not exist, 
depositors were sensitive to the bankruptcy risk of banks.  Given this behavior of depositors, the 
effects of bank consolidation were thought to be relatively significant, because consolidation enlarges 
the bank scale and thereby enables the bank to diversify its portfolio and reduce the risk of bankruptcy.  
In fact, Saunders and Wilson[1999] showed that equity ratios of banks in Britain and Canada 
substantially declined in the early 1900s, where bank consolidation proceeded. They interpreted this as 
a reflection of the decline in the equity level requested by depositors.  However, their paper did not 
statistically test the effect of bank consolidation.  We will perform a statistical test of this effect under 
the condition where a deposit insurance system did not exist.                  
     The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides an overview of the historical background   5
of the bank merger movement in prewar Japan.  Section 3 outlines the analyses of the relationship 
between the consolidation and governance structure of banks, focusing on director interlocking.  
Section 4 examines the effects of consolidation on bank performance after which Section 5 provides a 
summary to conclude the paper. 
 
2.Historical background of the bank merger movement 
     The industrial organization of the Japanese banking industry was substantially different from that 
seen in the postwar period.  The most remarkable feature is that numerous banks entered the industry, 
owing to the loose entry regulations, and as a result, many banks also exited the industry thorough 
failure and mergers. 
     The history of the modern banking industry in Japan started with the National Bank Act in 1872.  
National banks were private banks, which were privileged to issue bank notes.  After the Bank of 
Japan was established as the central bank in 1882, the national banks were reorganized into ordinary 
banks, and at the same time many other ordinary banks were established.  Besides ordinary banks, 
there were deposit banks, which specialized in small sized deposits.  The number of private banks 
swelled to as many as 2334 (1890 ordinary banks and 444 deposit banks) at its peak in 1901 (Figure 1).  
After that, the selection of banks due to market forces started, and at the same time, the government 
introduced the policy intervention to reduce the number of banks and expand their scales.  From the   6
early 1900’s, the government restricted the entry of new banks, by setting a lower limit of capital 
required to gain a license.  Then, from the early 1920’s, the government stopped licensing new banks 
as well as allowing the establishment of new branches, and at the same time it promoted bank mergers 
(Table 1). 
     In 1927, a powerful measure to urge bank consolidations was given to the government.  The 
Bank Law in 1927 set the lower limit of bank capital to one million yen, and obliged existing banks to 
clear this limit in five years
2.  When this law was legislated, there were 1420 ordinary banks, out of 
which 807 did not clear the limit.  Furthermore, the government did not approve each of those banks 
to increase capital by itself.  As a result, those banks were obliged to choose one of the two 
alternatives, liquidation or consolidation.  The number of bank exits due to consolidation increased to 
222 in 1928, when the Bank Law was enacted.  Then, during the Second World War, the government 
de facto forced banks to merge.  When the war ended, the total number of banks was reduced to 65, 
and the basic structure of the postwar banking industry had emerged. 
     The basic reason the government promoted bank mergers after the 1920’s was that it recognized 
that a financial system with numerous small-sized banks was unstable.  Also, the financial 
authorities recognized that there was another basic factor for the instability of the financial system, 
namely the close bank-firm tie.  For example, after the financial crisis in 1927, the Bank of Japan 
                                                        
2 As to the banks whose headquarters were located in Tokyo and Osaka, the limit was 2 million yen, 
and as to the banks whose head quarters were located in the towns whose populations were less than 
ten thousand, it was five hundred thousand yen.   7
reported that the control of banks by industrial companies was the basic reason for the crisis (Bank 
of Japan[192x]).   
     Okazaki and Yokoyama[2002] quantifies the bank-firm relationship in 1926, focusing on the 
director interlocking.  They counted the number of cases in which directors and auditors of each bank 
were at the same time directors and auditors of industrial companies, and found that that number, a 
bank-firm tie measure, was negatively related to the profitability of each bank.  This implies that in 
prewar Japan a close bank-firm tie was an unfavorable factor for the bank, as was evident in 
contemporary Mexico (La Porta et al[2001]).                            
     It is remarkable that the government expected that bank consolidation would resolve the unsound 
relationship between the banks and industrial companies.  Specifically, they thought that if a small 
bank was acquired by a large bank to become one of its branches, unsound loans due to the tie between 
the small bank and related industrial companies would be reduced.  Also, the government expected 
that as a result of the consolidation, full-time managers would increase, on the ground that 
employment of a full-time manager had scale economy (Shiratori[2002]). 
 
3  The Effect of Consolidation on The Governance Structure 
3.1  Data and Samples 
     In this section, we examine the impact of bank consolidation on the governance structure of   8
banks.  Specifically, we focus on the interlocking of directors and auditors between banks and 
non-banking firms.  It is because the data on the ownership structure are limited, and also the 
borrowing data of each firm by bank are generally not available.  On the other hand, according to 
Okazaki and Yokoyama [2002] and other related literatures, it is expected that we can capture the 
strength of the bank-firm ties using the information on the interlocking of directors and auditors. 
     In order to examine the effect of the bank consolidation on director interlocking, we use the 
consolidation samples in the period from Jan.1927 to Dec.1929.  This is because bank consolidations 
increased tremendously due to the Bank Law, promulgated in 1927.  The data source of the bank 
consolidations is Ginko Jiko Geppo (Monthly Bank Affairs) published by the Bank of Japan (Bank of 
Japan [1964]).  From this source we can obtain the basic information on each bank consolidation, 
including the event date, the names of participating banks, the prefecture where their head offices were 
located, the amount paid-in capital in pre-merger banks and post-merger banks, and the consolidation 
type.  In this source, bank consolidations are classified into three types, namely, absorption, 
acquisition and combination into a new bank.  Here, the combination into a new bank refers to a type 
of consolidation where a new bank was established after dissolvingall of the participants.                                
The information on the type of consolidation is useful because we can infer the power balance 
among the pre-consolidation banks from it. According to Kin’yu Kenkyukai [1934], in the case where 
the powers of the pre-consolidation banks were equal, they tended to choose to combine into a new   9
bank.  On the other hand, when one bank dominated the other participants, absorption or acquisition 
tended to be chosen.  Hereafter, we classify bank consolidations into absorbing consolidations and 
mergers of equals.  The former includes absorptions and acquisitions in Ginko Jiko Geppo, while the 
latter refers to combinations into new banks. 
The financial data of each bank is obtained from various issues of Ginkokyoku Nenpo (Year Book 
of the Bank Bureau of the Ministry of Finance), which covers all of the banks in Japan.  To compile 
the data on interlocking of directors and auditors between banks and non-banking firms, we use Ginko 
Kaisha Yoroku (Directory of the Banks and Firms) by Tokyo Koshinjo, one of the largest private credit 
bureaus.
3  This source allows us to capture the names and positions of the directors and auditors of 
each bank and non-banking firm with paid-in capital larger than twenty thousand yen.
4  With respect 
to the identification of the interlocking between banks and non-banking firms, we follow Okazaki and 
Yokoyama [2002].  Namely, if a person who was a director of a certain bank was at the same time a 
director of a certain non-banking firm, we identify that there was one interlock.  Meanwhile, if a 
person who was a director of a certain bank, was at the same time a director of two non-banking firms, 
we identify that there were two interlocks.  Since we are interested in the change of interlocking 
relationships between before and after a bank consolidation which occurred in the period from 1927 to 
                                                        
3 The positions of directors include chairman, president, vice-president, executive director, ordinary 
director and auditor.  Some banks did not have a position of senior director (chairman, president, 
vice-president, or executive director) 
4 While Ginko Kaisha Yorku of 1926 covers 1079 ordinary banks, Ginkokyoku Nenpo covers 1420 
ordinary banks.  The samples common to both sources are 1007 ordinary banks.          10
1929, we also included the data on the director interlocking in 1926 and 1931.
5 
   Table2 summarizes the data on interlocking, concerning all banks available in Ginko Kiasha 
Yoroku.  According to the table, nearly 80% of ordinary banks were connected to non-banking firms 
through interlocking of directors and auditors, which reconfirms the result of Okazaki and 
Yokoyama[2002].  Categorizing the banks in terms of paid-in capital, we find that the percentage of 
the banks with director interlocking was the highest in the large-sized group.  The same relationship 
is also observed in the average number of interlocks per bank and per director.  Paying attention to the 
change from 1926 to1931, we find that the average number of interlocks per bank and per director 
increased slightly.  
    Now, we select the samples to examine the effect of bank consolidation.  As mentioned above, 
the sample period from 1927 to 1929 was the period when an especially large number of bank 
consolidations occurred.  However, we cannot use all of them as the samples for the following two 
reasons.  The first reason is data availability.  Since Ginko Kaisha Yoroku does not contain 
information on banks and non-banking firms with paid-in capital of less than twenty thousand yen, we 
should limit the consolidation samples to those in which paid-in capitals of all the participants were at 
                                                        
5 Editing Ginko Kaisha Yoroku, Tokyo Koshinjo collected information by prefecture around April of 
each year.  This year book includes the index by person.  From this index, we can get the list of the 
director positions of each person. On the other hand, Zenkoku Shokaisha Yakuinroku (Directory of the 
Company Directors ), which is used by Okazaki and Yokoyama[2002], lacks this kind of index.  In 
this sense, Ginko Kaisha Yoroku is more useful. While, Zenkoku Shokaisha Yakuinroku covers more 
non-banking firms than the former, regarding the number of interlocks which we are particularly 
interested in, Ginko Kaisha Yoroku covers about 90% of Zenkoku Shokaisha Yakuinroku.                    11
least twenty thousand yen or larger.  The second reason is to eliminate the effect of the consolidation 
which occurred one year before and after our sample period.  For this purpose, we excluded those 
consolidations in which any participants took part in another consolidation in 1926.  At the same time, 
we excluded those consolidations in which any participants took part in another consolidation in 1930.  
As the control samples, we selected those banks which did not participate in any consolidations in the 
period between 1926 and 1930. 
   Panel A of Table3 shows the number of the consolidation samples and control samples selected in 
this way.  The merger participants are classified into four categories by the type of consolidation.  
Here, multi-times consolidation refers to that in which at least one bank experienced multiple 
consolidations within the sample period.  For example, if Bank A merged with Bank B in 1927, and 
also acquired Bank C in 1929, we regard these consolidations as one multi-times consolidation where 
Bank A consolidated with Bank B and Bank C.
6   
Panel B provides the information on the number of interlocks and total assets of the sample banks 
before consolidation, where the consolidation participants are classified into three groups, acquirer 
banks, target banks and participants of mergers of equals.  With respect to the multiple-time mergers, 
the consolidations which included at least one merger to form a new bank, are regarded as a merger of 
                                                        
6 Out of the 18 multiple-time consolidations, 15 experienced consolidations twice, and 3 experienced 
three times.  Following Berger and Humphrey [1992], we regard those consolidations as one 
consolidation, if an acquirer bank merged with another bank in the same year or the next year.     
   12
equals.
7  It is confirmed that while acquirer banks, the largest in total assets, had more interlocks than 
the other banks, the target banks comes to the top, in the case where we normalize interlocks by total 
assets (interlocks /total assets).   
                   
3.2  Quantitative Change of Director Interlocking 
To begin with, we examine how bank consolidations affected the extent of the director 
interlocking between banks and firms.  Concerning banks which participated in the consolidation i, 
the change of the interlocking from1926 to1931 is defined as follows: 






i INTERLOCK INTERLOCK INTERLOCK INTERLOCK + − = ∆  (1) 
where 
C
i INTERLOCK31  is the number of interlocks of the bank in 1931 after the consolidation, 
and 
k
i INTERLOCK26 (k=1,2) is the number of interlocks of the participant banks in 1926.  As for 
the non-consolidated banks, we simply use the difference of interlocks between 1926 and 1931.   
Panel A of Table4 compares the change of total number of interlocks between the consolidated and 
the non-consolidated banks.  The number of interlocks declined in all of the groups.  The reason for 
this general decrease of interlocking is thought to be the promulgation of the Bank Law in 1928, which 
regulated director interlocking.
8 Comparing the consolidated banks with the non-consolidated banks, 
                                                        
7. Consequently, the 16 samples out of 18 multiple-time consolidations are classified into the 
absorbing integration, and the other two samples are classified into a merger of equals. 
8 Inspection by the Bank of Japan started in 1928, where BOJ aimed at soundness its client banks. 
Also, inspection by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) started in 1927, where MOF aimed to promote not 
only sound banking but also urging bank consolidations (Ito[1928]).     13
we found that the interlocks decreased more significantly in the former than in the latter (-32.1% 
versus -20.7%).    This fact seems to indicate that consolidations had the effect of reducing interlocking.   
However, a more detailed examination including statistical tests, is necessary.  Panel B of Table4 
shows the distributions of the number of interlocks in 1926 between the consolidated banks and the 
non-consolidated banks.  The distribution of the non-consolidated banks is biased toward the lower 
side, compared with that of the consolidated banks.  Therefore, if we simply compare the change of 
the numbers of interlocks between the two groups, the difference of the initial distributions might be 
reflected in the result.
9  
   Hence, we selected an appropriate peer sample matched for each consolidated bank, out of the 387 
non-consolidated banks, instead of using all of the control samples.  In selecting peer samples, we 
took into account of the number of interlocks in 1926, asset size and operating area.
10  Panel C 
compares the average changes of interlocks, defined by Equation (1), between the consolidated banks 
and the selected matched non-consolidated banks.  In comparison, we split the samples into several 
sub-samples, by type of the consolidation, by area and by asset size.  With respect to the consolidation 
type, we focus on the distinction between absorbing consolidations and mergers of equals.  With 
respect to the area, we focus on the distinction between the urban area and non-urban area.  The urban 
                                                        
9 If we conduct the t-test without any adjustment, the difference of interlock in the number of interlock 
in means is statistically significant at 1 % level.  
10 As we mentioned above, since control samples have a bias toward the lower number of interlocks in 
1926, there no room to select in our discretion as for the matched banks with more than 15 interlocks in 
1926. Additionally, when we select the matched banks with less than 10 interlocks, we always select 
the non-consolidated bank which has the same interlocks as those of the paired consolidated bank.      14
area is defined as those prefectures including Tokyo, Osaka, Kagawa, Aichi, Kyoto and Hyogo, and 
the consolidation in urban area refers to that where the head office of the new bank was located in 
above five prefectures.  Finally, concerning the asset size, we divided the consolidation samples into 
three groups by the asset size of the pro-forma bank.   
According to Panel C, in the case of the full samples, decreases of the interlocks were 5.6 and 4.2 
respectively in the consolidated banks and the matched non-consolidated banks.  However, the 
difference between the two groups is not statistically significant.  Also, the cases in which decrease of 
the interlocks were larger in the consolidated banks, were no more than a half of the samples (33 out of 
69).    
Concerning the sub-samples, only in the case of the local area and medium scale, the decrease in 
the consolidated banks was larger than in the non-consolidated banks and the difference was 
statistically significant.  Even in these cases, the significance level was marginal (10%). 
So far, it is observed that the number of interlocks generally decreased in the period from 1926 to 
1931, but that the decrease was not significantly greater in the consolidated banks.  However, this 
result does not necessarily mean that the consolidation had no effect on the interlocking.  To make 
this point clear, we paid attention to the types of consolidations, namely mergers of equals 
(combination into a new bank) and absorbing consolidations.  First, let us examine mergers of equals.  
The banks which took part in this type of consolidations had 221 interlocks in total, before the   15
consolidations (total number of directors were 122), and after the consolidations, the number of 
interlocks decreased to 131.  Examining these 221 pre-consolidation interlocks, we found that it was 
not rare that a bank director who held a director position in a non-banking firm, also had a director 
position of the bank which was to be consolidated with the former bank.  Hereafter we refer to this 
kind of director as a “duplicated bank director”.  Actually, out of the 122 bank directors with 
interlocking positions, 20 were duplicated bank directors.  After the consolidations, 75 percent of 
these duplicated bank directors remained as the directors of the newly established banks.  This fact 
indicates that not a small part of the combinations into new banks, occurred within the same corporate 
groups.  In this case, it is unlikely that the bank consolidation altered the relationship between banks 
and firms.  
On the other hand, the banks which participated in the absorbing consolidations, had 390 
directors with interlocking positions, out of which only 8 were duplicated bank directors.  Also, the 
acquirer banks are expected to have strong incentives to exclude the relationship between the target 
banks and their related firms.  In order to check how interlocks of the target banks were affected by 
the mergers and acquisitions, we focused on those absorbing consolidations, where the target banks 
had at least more than zero interlocks before the consolidations.  There were 37 of those 
consolidations in our samples, and the participant banks had 193 interlocking directors.  According to 
Table 5, out of the 193 interlocking directors, 175 (91%) were eliminated from the post-consolidation   16
banks.  Moreover, in 22 consolidations out of 37 samples, all of the target banks’ directors with 
interlocking positions were eliminated. 
It is notable that the above analysis focuses only on whether the interlocking directors of the 
target banks were eliminated from the board of directors of the new banks.  Accordingly, if the 
directors of the firms related to the target bank, who had not been directors of the banks, were selected 
as directors of the acquirer banks after the consolidation, we overestimate the effect of eliminating the 
connection of the target with its related firms.  To check this possibility, we show the number of 
interlocks related to the target banks, in post-consolidation banks, in panel B of Table 5.  We can 
confirm that only 36 out of the total 579 interlocks in the post-consolidated banks, were related to the 
target banks.
11  
3.3  Effect on the Interlocking Relations of Senior Directors. 
     So far, we have analyzed the impact of consolidations on director interlocking with respect to all 
of the bank directors.  On the other hand, in the following analysis we focus on the senior directors of 
banks (i.e. president, chairman, vice-president, executive director), because, in general, senior 
directors are thought to have a larger influence on managerial decisions, including the lending policy.  
In addition, thorough focusing on senior directors, we can examine the increase in full-time managers.  
                                                        
11 According to Table5, as the directors of the target banks with interlocking positions  were 
eliminated by the 37 absorbing consolidations, the number of interlocks potentially declined by 376. 
However, it actually declined by only 302. That is, the acquirer banks, in contrast, strengthened the 
connection with their related firms during this period for some reason.    17
As mentioned in section 2, the Ministry of Finance expected an increase in full-time managers as a 
result of the bank consolidation.  
Table 6 compares the changes of the interlocks of senior directors between the consolidated and 
the non-consolidated banks.  Since some banks did not have senior directors, we excluded those 
banks from our samples.  Column (1) of Table 6 is  a comparison between the consolidated banks 
and all the non-consolidated samples, while column (2) is comparison between the consolidated banks 
and the matched non-consolidated samples.   
First, while in the consolidated banks, interlocks decreased by nearly 40%, in the 
non-consolidated banks, interlocks decreased by around only 15%.  In comparison with Panel A of 
Table4, based on all directors, the relative decrease of interlocks in the consolidated banks is clearer 
concerning the senior directors.  Also, the difference in the decrease between the two groups is 
statistically significant.  One possible reason for the great decrease in the number of senior director 
interlocks is that they had larger influence on managerial decisions.  The acquirer banks, which, as 
discussed above, tended to eliminate the directors of the target banks with interlocking relations, are 
thought to have stronger incentives to eliminate the senior directors of the target banks with 
interlocking relations.  Another reason is that the posts of senior directors were generally limited in 
number. Therefore, the probability for the senior directors of the pre-consolidation banks to lose their 
positions by the consolidation, was large, especially in a consolidation in which more than two banks   18
participated. 
     Next, we focus on full-time managers.  Here, we define a full-time manager of a bank as a senior 
director of a bank without any other positions of director or auditor.  According to Table 6, the 
percentage of full-time managers to all the senior directors in the consolidated banks did not change 
between pre-and post-consolidation.  While the percentage in the non-consolidated banks increased 
slightly, we cannot observe a significant difference.  Moreover, focusing on the average number of 
interlocks per senior director, we find that it increased in the consolidated, while it decreased in the 
non-consolidated banks.  This index is considered to be a good measure of managerial specialization, 
because the fewer other director positions a senior director held, the more time he could spend for the 
bank management.  After all, we can conclude that contrary to the expectation of the Ministry of 
Finance, bank consolidations did not have the effect of promoting specialization in terms of bank 
management. 
3.4  Qualitative Change of Director Interlocking  
     In this section, we examine the effect of bank consolidation on the nature of the director 
interlocking.  As discussed above, absorbing consolidations substantially eliminated the director 
interlocking in the target banks, and also consolidations in general had the effect of eliminating the 
interlocking of the senior directors.  These facts suggest the possibility that the nature of the director 
interlocking changed thorough bank consolidations.  We examine this possibility relying on the   19
method of Okazaki and Yokoyama[2002].  Using the data of 1926, Okazaki and Yokoyama[2002] 
obtained the result that the number of interlocks negatively affected the return on assets (ROA) of 
banks.  Accordingly, we examined how this negative relationship changed between pre-and 
post-consolidation.
12  
First, we estimated the effect of interlocks on ROA in the pre-consolidation year (1926) and the 
post-consolidation year (1931), concerning all the banks available in Ginkokyoku Nenpo and Ginko 
Kaisha Yoroku.  Since the profit data in Ginkokyoku Nenpo are censored at zero, we run Tobit 
regressions as follows: 
i i i i i BRANCH ASSET LN URBAN INTERLOCK LN ROA 4 3 2 1 0 ) ( ) 1 ( β β β β β + + + + + =  
                                                                           (2) 
where LN(1+INTERLOCK) is a natural log of the number of interlocks added by the value one, and 
URBAN is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the head office of the bank is in the urban 
prefectures (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Kyoto, Osaka and Hyogo), and zero otherwise.  ASSET and 
BRANCH denote the total assets and the number of braches, respectively.   
Column 1 and 2 of Table 7 show the results of the estimation with respect to all of the banks 
available in our data source.  The coefficient of LN(1+INTERLOCK) is negative and statically 
                                                        
12 In calculating ROA, since we use the end of total assets as the denominator, the profit of the second 
half of the year, multiplied by two, is used as the numerator, instead of total profit of the year (the 
profit of the first half plus the that of the second half). Even if we use the profit of the year, the result 
did not change qualitatively.     20
significant at 5% level in 1926, namely the pre-consolidation year, which implies that the director 
interlocking had a negative effect on the profitability of the banks, which is consistent with Okazaki 
and Yokoyama[2002].  The coefficients of URBAN and LN(ASSET) are negative and statistically 
significant. This relationship is inferred to reflect the situation that while medium-and large-sized 
banks were very competitive in the urban area, many of the small banks had monopolistic powers in 
the segmented local market (Imuta[1976]; Teranishi[1982]).  On the other hand, as for 1931, the 
post-consolidation year, while the coefficient of LN(1+INTERLOCK) is still negative, its magnitude 
declined by 40%, and also it is statistically insignificant.  We can say that the negative effect of the 
director interlocking became weak in the period from 1926 to 1931, concerning the banking industry 
as a whole. 
    In order to show that this change of the nature of the director interlocking was due to bank 
consolidations, we estimate the same equations, splitting samples into those banks participating in 
consolidations and the control samples.  To capture the effect of director interlocking in the 
consolidated banks and in the non-consolidated banks respectively, the interaction terms, 
CONS*LN(1+INTERLOCK) and (1-CONS)*LN( 1+INTERLOCK) are added to the independent 
variables, where CONS is the dummy variable that takes the value one, if the bank participated in a 
consolidation, and zero otherwise.
13 
                                                        
13 While in column [3]-[6] of Table 7 [3]-[6], the dummy variables (CONS, ABSO, ABSOTRG, 
NEW) and their interaction terms with LN(1+interlock) are included, we also estimated the equations   21
    Column 3 and 4 of Table 7 show the estimation results in the pre-and post-consolidation years, 
respectively.  As to the pre-consolidation year (1926), the coefficients of both 
CONS*LN(1+INTERLOCK) and (1-CONS)*LN(1+INTERLOCK) are negative. However, while the 
former is statistically significant at 1% level, the latter is insignificant.  Namely, before the 
consolidations, the director interlocking of the consolidation participants was worse in quality than 
that of the non-participating banks.  With respect to the post-consolidation year (1931), as shown in 
column 4, the coefficient of CONS*LN(1+INTERLOCK) is still negative, but statically insignificant.  
Moreover, its magnitude substantially declines.  On the other hand, the coefficient of 
(1-CONS)*LN(1+INTERLOCK) hardly changed.  These results can be interpreted that the nature of 
director interlocking changed thorough consolidations. 
Why is this remarkable change observed?  In order to address this question, we focus on the 
types of the consolidation.  As mentioned in section 3, we classify bank consolidations into the 
absorbing consolidations and merger of equals (merger into a new bank). Also, as to the former, we 
classify the participants into the acquirer banks and the target banks.  Using these split samples, we 
estimate the same equations (column 5 and 6 of Table 7), where ABSO and EQ are the dummy 
variables which take the value one, if the bank took part in an absorbing consolidation and a merger of 
equals, respectively, and zero otherwise.    In the pre-consolidation regression, ABSO indicates that the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
excluding CONS, ABSO, ABSOTARG, and NEW. However, the coefficients of the interaction terms 
did not change qualitatively.     22
bank was to be an acquirer, and ABSOTRG indicates that the bank was to be a target of an absorbing 
consolidation. 
      In the pre-consolidation regression (column 5), comparing the coefficients of the interaction 
term between the acquirer banks and the target banks, we find that the latter is negative and 
statistically significant at 1% level, and that its magnitude is considerably larger than that of the former.  
This result indicates that the director interlocking of the target banks was relatively poor in terms of 
quality.  As for the merger of equals, the coefficient of the interaction term is nearly the middle value 
between the acquirers and the targets of the absorbing consolidations.  All of the constant-term 
dummies (ABSO, ABSOTRG, EQ) have positive coefficients, which implies that the consolidated 
banks were more profitable than the non-consolidated banks for the reasons other than director 
interlocking.  In particular the coefficient of ABSOTRG is large.  This is considered to reflect the 
situation that the target banks had more or less monopolistic power in the separated local market.   
Column 6 reports the post-consolidation estimation.  Concerning consolidations of equals, the 
coefficient of EQ*LN(1+INTERLOCK) is smaller in magnitude as well as statistically insignificant.  
However, it does not indicate that the nature of director interlocking changed thorough consolidations, 
because this coefficient was also insignificant in the pre-consolidation year.  With regard to absorbing 
consolidations, the coefficient of ABSO*LN(1+INTERLOCK) was not affected by absorbing the 
target banks.  In other words, the nature of the director interlocking in the acquirer banks did not   23
change
14.   
Synthesizing these results with the observations in 3.3, we can conclude that concerning 
absorbing consolidations, a substantial part of the interlocking connections in the target banks, which 
was poor in quality before the consolidations, were eliminated by the consolidations, and that as a 
result, the negative effect of the director interlocking disappeared.  Concerning the consolidations of 
equals, the quality of the director interlocking did not change thorough the consolidations.  This is 
because as pointed out in 3.3, a substantial part of the participants in this type of consolidations were 
affiliated to the same corporate groups.                           
    
4.  Consolidation and the bank performance  
 
4.1. Sample  and  Methodology 
 
In this section we examine the relationship between bank consolidations and stability of the 
financial system.   Specifically, we focus on the two indicators, which were supposed to have a strong 
effect on the stability of the financial system, that is, the ability of banks to attract deposits measured 
by deposit growth rate, and the profitability measured by return on assets (ROA).
15  Due to the lack of 
the safety-net for depositors in prewar Japan, bank runs frequently occurred, and consequently many 
                                                        
14 The target banks were extinguished thorough the consolidation, by definition. 
15 We have much literature on the impact of consolidation on the bank performance. (Berger and 
Humphrey[1992]; Cornett and Teranian[1992]; Linder and Crane[1992]; Pilloff[1996]; Rodes 
[1992,1998]).  While some of them focus on cost and X-efficiency, we cannot do it, since the 
information on cost is not available in Ginkokyoku Nenpo.     24
banks were obliged to be closed.  Also, Yabushita and Inoue [1993] reported that the probability of a 
bank to be closed was negatively correlated with its profitability.
16 
When a banking system is not protected by the deposit insurance system, the potential benefit of a 
bank consolidation is thought to be larger.  Because the diversifying of a loan portfolio by a bank 
consolidation reduces depositor’s risk, and thereby lowers the probability of a bank run.  Therefore, a 
consolidated bank can enhance the profitability of its portfolio thorough reducing idle reserve holdings 
in preparation for withdrawal of deposits.
17   
     We investigate the effect of consolidation by comparing the performance of the consolidated 
banks with the non-consolidated banks in the period from one year before the consolidation to two and 
three years after the consolidation.  In order to capture the effect of consolidations in broad terms, we 
extend the sample period of the preceding sections.  That is, we use all the consolidations of ordinary 
banks in the period from 1927 to 1932 as samples.
18  As a result, we have 164 consolidation samples, 
in which 392 banks were involved.  Table8 provides the basic statistics on the pre-consolidation 
                                                        
16 While Yabushita and Inoue[1993] uses ROE(return on equity) as a measure of  profitability, we 
focus on ROA . This is because we would like to examine how efficiency of asset management was 
improved by the consolidation. 
17 Saunders and Wilson (1999) interprets that the secular decline in the capital ratios of the Canadian 
and British banks from 1900s to 1920s, reflected the decline of the capital level requested by the 
depositors, based on, Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and Calomiris and Wilson (1998).  We cannot 
directly apply their studies to the prewar Japanese banking industry, since most of the banks did not 
take part in the open capital market, and consequently they were thought to be unable to adjust their 
capital level at will.  
18 Since Ginko Kaish Yoroku, the source of data on the director interlocking, does not contain the data 
of the banks with paid-in capital less than twenty thousand yen, the consolidations involving those 
banks are excluded from the samples in the previous section. However, in this section our sample 
includes these small banks, because we do not use data of Ginko Kaish Yoroku in this section.     25
banks.  According to this table, the acquirer banks were larger in terms of assets than the other banks, 
including the target banks, the banks participated in the mergers of equals, and the non-consolidated 
banks.  On the other hand, the target banks and the participants of the mergers of equals had a 
relatively high ROA, which are considered to reflect the fact that those banks had more or less market 
power in the segmented local markets.
19 
     We used the following OLS regression to measure the effect of consolidation:  
i i i i i URBAN BRANCH ASSET LN CONS X 4 3 2 1 0 ) ( β β β β β + ∆ + + + =      (1) 
The dependent variable, i X , is the difference of ROA or deposit growth rate from T-1 to T+2 orT+3, 
where the consolidation was assumed to occur in year T.  ￿BRANCH denotes the difference of the 
number of the branches.  LN(ASSET) is the natural log of the total assets in year T-1.  Here, 
concerning the variables of the consolidated bank in year T,  the value of the pro-forma bank is used.  
The definitions of URBAN and CONS are the same as in Section3.   
Now, we are particularly interested in the sign of the dummy variable, CONS.  The coefficient 
is expected to be positive with respect to both dependent variables, if the consolidation had a positive 
impact on the bank performance.  Since the number of consolidation samples is not large enough to 
estimate the model year by year, we pool all the samples, and use year dummy variables to control for 
the shocks common to the samples of the same year.  
                                                        
19 Concerning the return on assets, Linder and Crane [1992] show that the target banks have higher 
ratios of net interest income to assets than the acquirer banks. They explain that this is because the 
structure of loan portfolio and liabilities is different between large banks and small banks.         26
 
 4.2 Empirical Results 
Table9 indicates the OLS estimation of Equation (3).  Column 1 and 2 are the results of the 
deposit growth rate regressions, regarding the periods from T-1 to T+2 and T-1 to T+3, respectively.  
The coefficients of CONS are positive and statistically significant, which means the capability to 
collect deposits was enhanced thorough the consolidation.  It is remarkable that the coefficient of 
LN(ASSET) and ∆BRACH are also positive and statistically significant.  Besides the effect of the 
consolidation itself, it increased the ability to collect deposits through raising the asset size and branch 
number of the bank
20 
     The background behind these results is thought to be the Showa Financial Crisis in 1927 and the 
Great Depression.  It is inferred that negative shocks in the lack of protection by the deposit insurance 
system urged risk-averse depositors to transfer their deposits to larger banks which were perceived to 
be safer.  Based on the data from 1900 to 1940, Teranishi(1982) confirms that bank deposits shifted 
from small and medium banks to the five large banks (Daiichi,Mitsubishi,Mitsui,Sumitomo and 
Yasuda)  and  the postal savings.  Negative coefficients of the year dummies reflect that the shift 
from bank deposits to postal savings progressed after the Showa financial Crisis in 1927, because the 
benchmark of the year dummies is the consolidation samples in 1927( i.e., the change from the end of 
                                                        
20 Based on the deposit and loan data of Mitsubishi Bank by branch, Okazaki [2002b] shows that the 
increase of the branches in 1920s and 1930s mainly contributed to collecting deposits.      27
1925 to the end of 1929 or 1930).  Assuming that depositors had strong preferences over the safe 
assets, we can interpret the positive effect of the consolidation to mean that consolidations were 
perceived by depositors as a good signal concerning the risk of bank failure. 
Next, column 3 and 4 provide the results with respect to the difference of ROA. The coefficients 
of CONS are negative and statically significant at 5% and 1% level, respectively.
21  According to the 
results, ROA declined 0.3-0.4% thorough the consolidations
22.  On the other hand, LN(ASSET) had a 
strongly positive effect on the bank profitability.  The average magnitude of economies of scale is 
approximately 0.05-0.1%.
23   However, compared with the effect of CONS, the negative effect of 
consolidation cannot be offset by the economies of scale.   
On the other hand, as shown in Table 8, scale economy was not observed in terms of profitability 
before the consolidation year.  These facts suggest that the profit structure in the banking industry 
changed in the late 1920s.  The result that the coefficient of URBAN is positive and statistically 
                                                        
21 Since consolidations were often accompanied by the reevaluation of the asset, we adjust the asset of 
the post-consolidation bank in the following way.   
ASSETT+i=ASSETT-1+(ASSETT+i-ASSETT), i=2, 3  
Without the adjustment, the effect of consolidation on ROA is still negative, but less significant.    
22 Since we did not include the banks which exited through failures and dissolutions, in estimating 
Equation (3), it is possible that the estimation results are affected by the sample selection bias.  
Therefore, we also estimated the sample selection model by the maximum likelihood method.  
According to the sample selection estimation, the bank consolidation still had a positive impact on the 
growth rate of deposits. Also the coefficient of CONS is larger in magnitude and statistically more 
significant, compared with the OLS estimation.  On the other hand, as for ROA, the coefficient of 
CONS is still negative, but statistically insignificant.  Anyways, there is no evidence indicating a 
positive impact of consolidation on profitability.    
23 We calculate the effects of the asset scale by the type of consolidation, based on the mean and the 
median of total assets of the pre-consolidation banks, respectively. The calculation is as follows:  








T ASSET Ln w ASSET Ln w ASSET ASSET LN − − − − + − + , 
where W is the weight based on total assets.    28
significant at 1% level, also supports this interpretation.
24  
      As discussed at the beginning of this section, bank consolidations, especially in relation to lack 
of deposit insurance, potentially enhance bank profitability.  However, in reality, the consolidation 
had a negative impact on ROA in prewar Japan.  In order to understand the reason for this negative 
effect, we pay attention to the types of consolidations again.  Integration of multiple organizations is 
generally accompanied by coordination costs.  The magnitude of this cost is likely to depend on the 
type of  consolidations.  Compared with absorbing consolidations, the coordination cost is expected 
to be larger in mergers of equals, where there was no dominant participant.
25  Additionally, as we saw 
in Section3, the effect of consolidation on the governance structure was different between absorbing 
consolidations and mergers of equals, which is also expected to bring about the different effects on the 
profitability.  Also, the more participants, the larger the coordination cost would be.   
      Therefore, we add the independent variables denoting these relevant factors to equation (3) with 
ROA as the dependant variable.  First, we replace CONS by is AQU, MRG and EQ, which denote 
acquisitions, absorbing mergers, and mergers of equals (combinations into new banks), respectively.  
Second, we add the set of the number-of-participants dummies, NOPk (k =3, 4 ￿￿￿, 8), which is 
                                                        
24 Okazaki [1993] argues that the difference of interest rates between the urban and the rural areas 
expanded in 1920s, because the local banks were deprived of good borrowers by urban banks and 
consequently had to increase risky mortgage loans.    
25 Berger et al. [1999] points out the cause of poor improvement of cost efficiency by M&As in the 
1980s was that the gains of M&A were offset by managerial difficulties in larger organizations, 
conflicts in corporate culture, or problems in integrating systems. Sanwa Bank [1974] describes the 
internal conflicts which Sanwa Bank suffered from just after the consolidation in 1933.  Sanwa Bank, 
the predecessor of UFJ Bank, was established thorough consolidation of three large banks.     29
value one, if the number of the participants is k, and zero otherwise.
26  Table 10 reports the results.  
In column 1 and 2, all the coefficients of the consolidation-type dummies are negative.  Particularly, 
the coefficient of EQ is statistically significant and larger in magnitude.  That is, mergers of equals 
had a larger negative impact on the profitability.  On the other hand, the coefficients of absorbing 
consolidation dummies (AQU and MRG) are statistically insignificant.  These results indicate that 
the impact of the absorbing consolidations on the profitability was small.  Therefore, we can basically 
attribute the negative impact of consolidation in Table 9 to the merger of equals. 
     In column 3 and 4, we add NOPk to control the impact of the number of the consolidation 
participants.  The coefficients of NOP4 and NOP6 are negative and significant, but in the other cases 
they are not statistically significant.  Hence, we can say that there is no evidence of a stable 
relationship between the number of merger participants and the profitability of consolidated banks.  
On the other hand, comparing column 3 and 4 with column 1 and 2, we find that the magnitudes and 
statistical significance of the effects of EQ are smaller, when we control the number of the participants.  
It implies that the negative effects of the NEW on ROA in column 1 and 2 includes the effect of the 
number of participants.  Also, it is notable that the coefficient of NEW is still negative after 
controlling for the number of participants effect, which implies that the merger of equals results in the 
decline of efficiency.   This result is consistent with the results in the governance structure discussed in 
                                                        
26 Since there was no case where the number of merger participants was seven, we do not use the 
dummy variable, NOP7.     30
section 3. 
 ￿ Concluding  Remarks 
 In this paper, we analyzed the impact of bank consolidations on the stability of the financial system, 
focusing on two aspects, namely the governance structure and the bank performance.  With respect to 
the governance structure, we found that consolidations had an effect of excluding the unfavorable 
director interlocking between banks and their related firms, especially, in the case of absorbing 
consolidations.  This result has important policy implications for presently developing countries 
which are faced with the similar governance problem between banks and non-banking firms.  Berger 
et al. (2001) demonstrate that large banks have a little comparative advantage in making loans based 
on soft information using the US data.   They argue that it can be beneficial for developing countries to 
encourage entry of large multinational banks, which are less likely to engage in the related-lending.  
Our results support their discussion quantitatively, as long as the well-disciplined multinational banks 
enter these countries through acquiring unsound domestic banks.                 
Concerning the stability of the financial system, we confirmed that consolidations had a positive 
impact on deposit growth.  This effect was significant for the stability of the financial system, because 
due to the lack the deposit insurance system, the financial system was continuously exposed to the risk 
of bank.  In this sense, we can conclude that bank consolidations contributed to the stability of the 
financial system.  On the other hand, we cannot obtain any evidence indicating a positive impact of   31
consolidations on the profitability of banks.  Especially, in the case of the merger of equals, a strongly 
negative effect on the profitability was observed, which suggest that inasmuch as the enhanced ability 
to collect deposits, mergers of equals might have a negative effect on the financial system in the long 
run.
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1902 39 31 3 5
1903 89 26 58 5
1904 57 39 14 4
1905 43 31 9 3
1906 35 21 11 3
1907 42 24 10 8
1908 36 28 5 3
1909 34 28 3 3
1910 15 10 2 3
1911 13 7 5 1
1912 18 5 7 6
1913 26 18 6 2
1914 27 12 13 2
1915 11 4 5 2
1916 31 10 14 7
1917 45 19 10 16
1918 39 15 3 21
1919 66 20 15 31
1920 60 11 17 32
1921 48 15 2 31
1922 59 17 0 42
1923 101 16 0 85
1924 81 32 0 49
1925 106 37 0 69
1926 133 46 0 87
1927 148 58 0 90
1928 281 59 0 222
1929 164 54 0 110
1930 105 26 0 79
1931 108 52 0 56
1932 162 102 0 60
1933 24 13 0 11
1934 36 18 0 18
1935 20 7 0 13
1936 45 24 0 21
1937 51 12 0 39
1938 33 4 0 29






Table1 Number of exits of ordinary banks by cause
Total ConsolidationPanlA  Year 1926
Classes by paid-in capital Number of banks Number of banks with interlocks Ratio to all banks Number of interlocks (mean) Number of interlocks per director (mean)
Total 1,079 900 83.4% 7.39 0.86
0-1million yen 852 679 79.7% 4.87 0.63
1-10million yen 207 201 97.1% 15.24 1.56
10 million yen- 20 20 100.0% 33.25 3.24
Panel B  Year 1931
Classes by paid-in capital Number of banks Number of banks with interlocks Ratio to all banks Number of interlocks (mean) Number of interlocks per director (mean)
Total 661 541 81.8% 7.96 0.88
0-1million yen 458 344 75.1% 3.94 0.52
1-10million yen 185 179 96.8% 14.51 1.45
10 million yen- 18 18 100.0% 42.94 4.16
The table provides summary statistics on the interlocking of directors and auditors between banks and non-banking firms by the scale of banks, in 1926 and 1931. The sample consists of all banks available from Ginko 
Kaisha Yoroku . Panel A refers to the sample of 1926 and Panel B refers to that of 1931. An interlock is defined as follow. If a person who was a director of a certain bank was at the same time a director of a non-banking
company, we identify there was one interlock.  If a person who was a director of a certain bank was at the same time a director of two non-banking companies, we identify that there were two interlocks.    
Table2  Interlocking of directors and auditors between banks and non-banking firms in 1926 and 1931Panel A  Sample obserbations
Total 1927 1928 1929 Number of 
Paticipants
1. Consolidated banks
   Absorbing merger 23 8 9 6 47
   Acquisition 11 2 7 2 22
   Combination into a new bank 17 5 7 5 42
   Multi-times merger 18 61
Total 69 172
 2. Non-consolidated banks 387 387
PanelB Summary Statistics
(1)Non-consolidated banks
Mean Median Std.Dev. Max Min Obs
Number of interlocks 6.25 3.00 8.53 66 0 387
Total assets(million yen) 7.03 1.9 39.32 572.07 0.25 387
Interlocks/total assets 2.98 1.45 4.39 37.17 0 387
Number of directors 8.06 8 2.7 24 1 387
(2) Acqurier banks 
Mean Median Std.Dev. Max Min Obs
Number of interlocks 11.52 8.50 12.58 63 0 50
Total assets(million yen) 36.49 12.28 87.24 475.59 0.76 50
Interlock/total assets 1.16 0.56 1.73 8.46 0 50
Number of directors 9.58 9 2.76 16 4 50
(3) Target banks
Mean Median Std.Dev. Max Min Obs
Number of interlocks 5.84 4.00 7.55 34 0 74
Total assets(million yen) 5.19 1.96 11.8 80.12 0.06 74
Interlock/total assets 4.45 1.41 13.4 88.16 0 74
Number of directors 8.95 8.5 3.14 21 1 74
(4) Paticipants of merger of equals 
Mean Median Std.Dev. Max Min Obs
Interlock 5.73 4.00 5.49 27 0 48
Total assets(million yen) 2.17 1.66 1.7 8.72 0.48 48
Interlock/total assets 3.11 2.91 2.59 9.88 0 48
Number of directors 8.17 8 2.67 16 2 48
Table 3:  Summary statistics of the consolidation samples
The table presents summary statistics of the consolidation samples which took place between 1927 and 1929.
Combination into a new bank refers to the type of consolidation where once all of the participants dissolve, a
new bank is established. Multi-times merger in panel A refers to the consolidation which involves at least one
bank experiencing consolidation more than once in the sample period 1927-1929. In panel B, merger of equals
refers to a combination into a new bank or multi-times merger which involves at least one combination into a
new bank. The rest of the consolidations are difined as absorbing consolidations where we can identify target
banks and acquirer banks.  Total assets are defined as total capital plus total deposits. Panel A  Interlocking of directors in pre-and post-marger years
Number 
of banks
 Number of interlocks
69 1,207 819 -32.1%
50 986 688 -30.2%
19 221 131 -40.7%
387 2,420 1,920 -20.7%
PanelB Distribution of tne numbers of interlocks in 1926 







Total 69 100.0% 387 100.0%
0 4 5.8% 64 16.5%
1-5 12 17.4% 179 46.1%
6-10 17 24.6% 80 20.6%
11-15 6 8.7% 32 8.2%
16-20 10 14.5% 5 1.3%
21-30 5 7.2% 17 4.4%
31- 15 21.7% 10 2.6%
Classes by the 




2. Non-consolidated   banks
Merger of equals








This table presents the change of the number of interlocks between pre-and post-merger years. Panel
A shows that total number of interlocks by consolidation type. Merger of equals refers to combination
into a new bank and multi-times merger which contains at least one combination into a new bank.
Absorbing consolidation refers to the other types of absorbing merger and acquisition, where one of
the participants is dominant. Panel B shows the distribution of the numbers of interlocks in 1926.
Panel C compares the average change of interlocks in consolidated banks and matched non-
consolidated banks, and the results of statistical tests by type of consolidation, by area and by scale.
The "urban area" indicates that the head office of the post-consolidated bank was located in Tokyo,
Osaka, Kanagawa, Aichi, Kyoto or Hyogo prefecture. The t-statistics and z-statistics indicate the
result of the test (t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test) for the difference between the consolidated banks
and the the matched banks. "*" indicates that the difference is significant at 10 % level using two tailed
test. Teble 4: Panel C
Panel C  Average change of director interlocking and statistical tests




(1)Full sample -5.62 -4.22 1.04 69
(-3.00) (-1.00) (1.13)
Number of the case where 1<2 33 36
By type of consolidation
(2)Absorbing conoslidation -5.96 -4.42 0.85 50
(-2.50) (-1.00) (0.93)
(3)Merger of equals -4.74 -3.68 0.91 19
(-5.00) (-2.00) (0.75)
By area
(4)Local area -6.81 -4.06 1.83 * 54
(-4.00) (-1.00) (1.73) *
(5)Urban area -1.33 -4.8 -1.25 15
(-1.00) (-2.00) (0.80)
By asset size
(6)Small -1.35 -1.78 -0.30 23
(-1.00) (0.00) (0.40)
(7)Medium -4.57 -2.48 1.63 23
(-3.00) (-1.00) (1.65) *





2. Selected peer 
banksTabel 5:  Elimination of the influence of target banks in absorbing consolidations
Panel A  Eliminated influence of target banks
Number in pre-
consolidation bank
Number of the 
eliminated interlocks
%
Number of director with interlocks 193 175 90.7%
Number of interlocks  410 376 91.7%
Number of consolidations 37 22 59.5%
Panel B  Influence of target banks in post-consolidation banks
%
Number of interlocks  579 36 6.2%
Interlocks related with 
taget banks
The samples consist of 37 absorbing consolidations where the target banks had at least one interlock in pre-
consolidation bank. Part A presents to what extent the directors of the target banks and their interlocking
positions were eliminated through consolidations. The last row indicates the number of the absorbing
consolidations where all of the directors of the target banks with interlocking positions, were eliminated. Part B
presents the number of interlocks related with the target banks in comparison with all interlocks in post-merger
bank
Total interlocks in 37 
post-consolidation Number of banks 67 345 62 62
Pre- 385 675 383 298
Post- 238 597 231 254
Growth rate (%) -38.18 -11.56 -39.69 -14.77
Pre- 5.75 1.96 6.18 4.81
Post- 3.55 1.73 3.73 4.1
Difference (Mean) -2.20 -0.23 -2.45 -0.71
t-statistics 5.33 *** 2.28 **
z-statistics 3.23 *** 2.03 **
3. Ratio of full-time directors to 
all senior directors (%)
Pre- 53.4 54.8 51.5 31.3
Post- 54.9 57.2 50.8 40.4
Difference (%) 1.5 2.4 -0.7 9.1
Pre- 1.32 1.24 1.42 2.81
Post- 1.82 1.16 1.94 2.50
Difference (Mean) 0.50 -0.07 0.52 -0.31
t-statistics 2.21 ** 1.46
z-statistics 0.84 0.96
2. Average interlock of senior 
director (Mean)
4. Average Number of interlocks 








Table6  Interlocking of senior directors in pre- and post-consolidation banks
This table presents the details about interlocking of senior directors before and after consolidation.
Senior directors include president, chairman, vice-president and executive director. The full-time
managers are defined as the senior directors without any interlocking positions. The t-statistics and z-
statistics indicate the result of the test (t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test) for the difference between the
consolidated and non-consolidated banks. "***" and "**" indicate that the difference is statistically
significant at 1% and  5 %  levels using two tailed test.  
(1)Comparison with all 
non-consolidated 
bk
(2)Comparison with all 
matched banksTable 7 Tobit estimation of the effect of consolidation on director interlocking
Dependant variable  ROA
All banks Consolidated and Non-consolidated banks
1926 1931 1926 1931 1926 1931
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
INTERCEPT 9.523 3.676 12.09 2.461 12.376 2.622







LN(1+INTERLOCK)*(1-CONS) 0.034 -0.105 0.077 -0.091













URBAN -0.824 -0.46 -0.495 -0.405 -0.493 -0.417
(-3.436) *** (-2.077) ** (-1.467) (-1.328) (-1.461) (-1.366)
LN(ASSET) -0.324 -0.009 -0.519 0.011 -0.539 0
(-2.592) *** (-0.76) (-2.632) *** (0.063) (-2.715) *** (-0.003)
BRANCH -0.028 -0.075 -0.032 -0.04 -0.049 -0.045
(-1.654) * (-0.657) (-0.823) (-1.269) (-1.254) (-1.418)
Log likelihood -2516.79 -1397.83 -1429.6 -1001.5 -1426.44 -1000.73
Left censored obs 64 92 20 71 20 71
Total 1007 659 559 456 559 456
This table presents the results of the tobit regressions. In column 1 and 2, the samples consists of all the banks available in Ginkokyoku Nepo
and Ginko Kaisha Yoroku. In column 3-6, the samples consist of the consolidated banks and non-consolidated banks. The dependent variable
is return on assets (ROA). The definitions of independent variables are as follows. UBAN is dummy variable which is 1 if the head office of the
banks was lacated in Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa and Hyogo prefecture. LN(ASSET) is the natural log of total assets. BRANCH is the
number of branches. LN(1+INTERLOCK) is the natural log of the number of interlocks plus 1. CONS is a dummy variable which is 1 if the bank
was a merger participant. ABSO is the dummy variable which is 1 if the bank was the acquirer in the absorbing consolidation. ABSOTRG is the
dummy variables which is 1 if the bank was the target in the absorbing consolidation. EQ is the dummy variables which is 1 if the bank was a
participant of merger of equals (combination into a new bank). *** ,** and * indicate that the coefficients are significant at 1%,5 % and 10% levels
using two tailed test.  The z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Panel A Number of samples
Year Total Absorbing 
merger




bk Toal 164 64 48 52 2,026
1927 26 13 2 11 476
1928 41 13 15 13 391
1929 31 11 9 11 260
1930 18 8 6 4 275
1931 22 9 9 4 296
1932 26 10 7 9 328
Panel B Summary Statistics
Absorbing 
merger




Mean 26,439 2,561 1,499 9,550
Median 3,228 666 1,101 1,994
Std.dv. 99,413 9,032 1,422 52,839
Deposit (1000 yen)
Mean 21,496 1,976 1,038 7,499
Median 2,262 427 762 1,329
Std.dv. 81,059 7,045 1,072 43,094
Loan/Deposit
Mean 1.151 1.442 1.444 1.378
Median 1.073 1.142 1.239 1.139
Std.dv. 0.516 1.160 1.370 2.411
Mean 3.823 4.656 4.599 3.859
Median 3.220 3.481 4.051 3.197
Std.dv. 2.448 4.388 2.778 3.180
Number of Branches
Mean 7.77 1.66 1.82 4.26
Median 3.00 0.00 1.00 2.00
Std.dv. 15.58 3.14 2.70 8.23
Number of banks 111 131 150 2,026
Table 8  Summary statistics of consolidation samples
Total assets (1000yen)
Return on assets (%)[Deposit growth rate] [Difference of ROA]
[T+2] [T+3] [T+2] [T+3]
[1] [2] [3] [4]
INTERCEPT -21.407 -55.818 -3.897 -5.067
(-1.996) ** -4.879 *** (-5.344) *** (-6.376) ***
CONS 6.73 5.008 -0.394 -0.339
(2.839) *** (1.825) * (-2.287) ** (-1.731) *
LN(ASSET) 1.61 3.349 0.157 0.209
(2.185) ** (4.306) *** (3.218) *** (4.007) ***
URBAN -0.39 -1.921 0.389 0.491
(-0.15) (-0.708) (2.682) *** (3.4) ***
￿BRANCH 2.971 3.495 0.051 0.055
(5.893) *** (6.717) *** (4.515) *** (4.603) ***
Year Dummy
1928 -8.211 -9.277 -0.344 -0.348
(-2.198) ** (-2.389) ** (-1.794) * (-1.74) *
1929 -16.387 -11.47 -0.45 -0.112
(-5.953) *** (-3.733) *** (-2.108) ** (-0.494)
1930 -24.139 -10.746 0.534 1.036
(-8.668) *** (-3.366) *** (2.79) *** (5.233) ***
1931 -17.727 -4.364 1.051 1.455
(-6.288) *** (-1.365) (5.965) *** (7.899) ***
1932 -8.877 5.628 1.309 1.66
(-3.14) *** (1.768) * (7.56) *** (9.318) ***
Adj-R2 0.059 0.053 0.077 0.105
Obs 2,190 2,190 2190 2190
Table 9 OLS estimation of the effect of consolidation on bank performance
This table presents the results of OLS regressions. In column 1 and 3, we capture the consolidation
effect based on the data of one year before and two years after the consolidation. In column 2 and
4, we capture the effect based on the data one year before and two years after the consolidation.
The dependent variable is the deposit growth rate in column 1 and 2, and the difference of return on
assets (ROA) in column 3 and 4. The definitions of the independent variables are as follows: CONS
is the dummy variable which is 1 if the bank was consolidated one and zero otherwise. UBAN is the
dummy variable which is 1 if the head office of the banks was located in Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi,
Kanagawa and Hyogo prefecture. LN(ASSET) is the natural log of total assets. ￿BRANCH is the
number of branches. The value of pro-forma banks is used for consolidated banks. The t-ratios
with White robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses.Dependent variables: Difference of ROA
[T+2] [T+3] [T+2] [T+3]
[1] [2] [3] [4]
INTERCEPT -3.833 -4.997 -3.884 -5.043
(-5.208) *** (-6.222) *** (-5.262) *** (-6.264) ***
AQU -0.156 -0.112 -0.166 -0.116
(-0.74) (-0.35) (-0.787) (-0.359)
MRG -0.206 -0.114 -0.129 -0.039
(-0.628) (-0.318) (-0.401) (-0.113)
NEW -0.838 -0.822 -0.633 -0.729








(-1.831) * (-1.738) *
NOP8 0.301 0.479
(0.59) (0.877)
LN(ASSET) 0.152 0.205 0.156 0.208
(3.106) *** (3.88) *** (3.177) *** (3.943) ***
URBAN 0.383 0.485 0.379 0.481
(2.631) *** (3.354) *** (2.603) *** (3.331) ***
￿BRANCH 0.049 0.053 0.052 0.055
(4.336) *** (4.402) *** (4.241) *** (4.291) ***
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adju- R2 0.077 0.105 0.078 0.106
Obs 2190 2190 2190 2190
Table 10 OLS estimation of the effect of consolidation type and number of participants on bank
performance
This table presents the results of OLS regressions.   In column 1 and 3, we capture the consolidation effect 
based on the data of one year before and two years after the consolidation.  In column 2 and 4, we capture the 
effect based on the data one year before and two years after the consolidation. 
   The dependent variable is the difference of return on assets (ROA).  The definitions of the independent 
variables are follows.  AQU, MRG and EQ is the dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank participated in 
acquisition, absorbing merger and conbination into a new bank respectively, and zero otherwise. NOPi is the 
dummy variables which equals 1 if the number of participants was i. UBAN is dummy variable which equals 1 if 
the head office of the banks was located in Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa and Hyogo prefecture.  
LN(ASSET) is the natural log of total assets. ￿BRANCH is the number of branches. The value of pro-forma 
banks is used for consolidated banks. T-ratios with White robust standard errors are reported in parenthetes.  
The independent variables include year dummies, although they are not reported. 